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On 1st May 2004, ten countries will have joined the European Union
(EU): Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia. The presence of eight Central and
Eastern European countries (CEECs hereafter) among the ten
newcomers is particularly striking: these countries have had to make a
giant step from centrally planned to market economies over an
incredibly short time period. Accession to EU may thus be seen as a
legitimate reward for countries which have undertaken a profound
change in their political and economic structures. 
EU accession has been conditional on countries fully respecting the
so-called “Copenhagen criteria”, i.e. (i) “stability of institutions guaran-
teeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the respect for
and protection of minorities”; (ii) “the existence of a functioning market
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and
market forces within the Union”; (iii) “ability to take on the obligations
of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic
and monetary union”. The political agenda for successful accession was
therefore really demanding for countries where the “markets” were
formerly almost inexistent, administered price setting was the rule, trade
and financial relations were highly centralised and regulated, and incen-
tives were generally geared towards meeting the “plan” targets. 
Although major improvements have occurred, most of the CEECs
are still in a transition phase towards a market economy. For instance,
administered prices, despite a steep reduction, always represent a non
negligible share of the consumer price index in countries like Hungary.
Moreover, notwithstanding recent good performances as regards GDP
growth rates, most notably in comparison with the EU average, the
CEECs are substantially lagging behind EU-15 in terms of GDP per
capita. In Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia, the
PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in 2001 was lower than Portugal’s and
Greece’s at the time of their EU accession. Hence, this fifth enlargement since the creation of the European
Community differs from the previous ones in some important respects.
First, this new accession round occurs on a very large scale: it is the
widest enlargement up to now, especially in terms of population and
land area. The EU-25 population and land area are being respectively
increased by 20% and 25%. Sharply contrasting with these features, the
EU-25 GDP is only being increased by 5% (at current exchange rates). 
Second, the aforementioned gap of the average GDP per capita
between the new accession countries and the EU-15 challenges the
capacity of the former to catch-up rapidly on the latter. 
Third, abiding by the whole EU legislation (the acquis communautaire)
is a very difficult task and was not required at the same level of
complexity when countries like Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal were
preparing themselves for accession. Complying with the EU legislation
may also be costly: some industries should not only be restructured in
order to gain competitiveness, but they should also participate in the
improvement of the environment, through less polluting activities or
production technologies. Also important in the present acquis commu-
nautaire, EU accession entails planning EMU accession, which means that
the new accession countries will have to satisfy the so-called Maastricht
criteria sooner or later, including participation in the ERM II. This will
impose constraints on the conduct of their economic policies. 
Fourth, this new enlargement will not automatically and immediately
give these countries the rights their compliance with the whole acquis
communautaire should entail: free movements of the labour force from
the East to the West will intervene only gradually, beginning at best in
2007, and being fully efficient in 2010. Consequently, migration is not
a short-term issue. The number of residents and workers from the
CEECs in the EU-15 corresponds to a share of 0.2% of the workforce
and population in the EU-15 and 0.8 % of the workforce and population
of the CEECs. Most studies converge to predict a long-term migration
potential of at most 3% of the current CEECs’ population (i.e. about
3 million individuals). 
Finally, full liberalisation of capital accounts is a prerequisite for
entering the EU, here again in sharp contrast with the experience of
past newcomers. In the present case, substantial short term capital
inflows towards and outflows from the CEECs might endanger the
sustainability of ERM II and cause financial instability.
In this Special Issue, we have aimed at focusing on the most
important challenges at head for the new Central and Eastern European
accession countries. So-called structural issues like the flexibility of the
labour markets or the adoption of fully-funded pension schemes, as
well as economic policy issues like proposals for reforming the Stability
and Growth Pact or the early adoption of the euro, are given peculiar
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in two contributions which emphasise, on the one hand, the dynamics
of trade and FDI relations between the CEECs and the EU-15 and, on
the other hand, the optimality of different reforms for the European
system of central banks. The Special Issue also has a contribution which
tries to assess the ability of the Turkish economy to cope with some
of the economic Copenhagen criteria (point (ii) upward), relating public
finances, inflation and banking deregulation issues.
The labour markets
A prominent issue, as far as the enlarged EU is concerned, is in
defining and understanding the most significant features of the new
accession countries’ labour markets. Beforehand, it is almost astonishing
to notice, in sharp contrast with economic policies, that no clear
guidance appears in the European legislation as far as domestic labour
markets are concerned. The Copenhagen criteria do refer to a market
economy, but the precise features of the domestic labour markets seem
beyond the scope of European treaties. Active labour market policies
(ALMP) and employment protection legislation (EPL) are part of a
terminology which is for instance relatively more present in the OECD’s
literature than in the EU’s, Commission’s or EP’s literature. 
Sandrine Cazes and Alena Nesporova1 start their contribution by
defining precisely the various flexible forms of employment in the
CEECs and, then, the extent to which their labour markets can be
labelled “flexible”, as regards the OECD reference in this domain. The
authors show that whereas flexibility has actually increased in the
CEECs, the forms it has taken are different from one labour market to
the other2 and, more importantly, they are different from the OECD
countries. The most striking evidence indeed, though statistics are rare,
is that of multiple-jobs: many persons have at least a second job and
sometimes even more jobs. Also worth noticing: part-time employment
is still scarce in the CEECs in comparison with the OECD countries. 
Cazes and Nesporova then evaluate labour market flexibility focusing
on labour turnover. They argue that in the OECD countries, new hiring
and quits of jobs increase when economic growth is high: labour
turnover behaves pro-cyclically. What their econometric evidence shows
is that, for the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia, the labour turnover
turns out to be counter-cyclical. During “good times”, the attractiveness
of productive jobs would thus be impaired by the reluctance of workers
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1. Longer developments are available in their book (Cazes S., and Nesporova, A. 2003. Labour
markets in transition: Balancing flexibility and security in Central and Eastern Europe. Geneva: ILO).
2. For instance, the share of temporary contracts in total employment contracts varies from
3% (in Estonia) to 13% (in Slovenia).to take the risk of quitting their less productive jobs. This behaviour is
perceived by the authors as having negative effects on labour produc-
tivity for the whole economy.
The shift from enterprise assistance to public institutions assistance
in most CEECs during the nineties has also negatively impinged on
employment protection and has increased the relative jobs preca-
riousness, i.e. high employment insecurity. Though employment
protection legislation strictness in the CEECs is on average very close
to that of the EU countries, the percentage of unemployed receiving
unemployment insurance benefits is very low in countries like Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia. Cazes and Nesporova therefore argue that this
leads to low participation rates. Consequently, more employment
protection could contribute to increasing economic activity of
population and to attracting workers to the formal, more productive,
sector. In their conclusion, Cazes and Nesporova conclude that estab-
lishing a “new balance between adjustment flexibility for enterprises and
employment and income security for workers” is a major challenge for
the CEECs.
The pension systems
Gaël Dupont, in his contribution to the present Issue, discusses the
reasons for the reforms of the pension systems and describes the early
years of functioning of the newly established systems. Dupont stresses
the costs of transition from the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system to the
three-pillar system adopted by most CEECs. The latter system, which
incorporates a PAYG tier, a compulsory pension funds and a voluntary
pension funds, has had fiscal consequences. Because a part of social
contributions has had to be redirected from Social Security to the
private pension funds, public balance could not be reached unless taxes
were raised and/or public expenditures were reduced. The examples
of Hungary and Poland are worth mentioning. In both countries,
Dupont argues that the number of people who joined the partially
private system exceeded governments’ expectations and thus led to
higher transition costs than initially thought. In Poland, these costs were
only partially met by privatisation, hence higher public borrowing. In
Hungary, past accrued rights were cut back and the private pension tier
has been phased in gradually in order to smooth the rise in the public
deficit.
Rather similarly to Cazes and Nesporova’s introductive description
of the move from a centrally-planned to a market economy on the
labour markets, Dupont shows that the shift from the public pension
system to a partly private one has been welcome by the policy-makers
THE NEW EU ENLARGEMENT
1 12 2
Special issue/April 2004and populations. Concerning pension systems, the gloomy prospects of
the old systems largely facilitated the transition to a pension funds
system: shrinking fertility rates, the anticipated dramatic rise in the share
of people over sixty, the very low pre-reform level of pensions and
the small incentives to be hired in “risky occupations”3 went on to
boost support for the reforms. 
Another appealing aspect in Dupont’s contribution is his nice
argumentation on the fact that pension reforms have helped to urge a
shift from moonlighting to declared and eventually more productive
activities. Because pensions are depending on contributions paid or
declared earnings, employees now face incentives to officially declare
their jobs and jobs’ earnings. This may partly participate in the increase
in productivity which Cazes and Nesporova consider as a major
challenge for the new accession countries. 
Finally, Dupont concludes in favour of a balance between, on the
one hand, a high rise in contribution rates, to compensate for the
transition costs to a private pension system and for the gloomy
demographic prospects in the CEECs and, on the other hand, a huge
decline in the relative purchasing power of pensions. Such a balance
would be attainable more easily the higher employment in the CEECs,
he finally notes.
Exchange rate policies
Among the new accession countries, the largest ones– the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland– have moved recently towards more or
less flexible exchange-rate regimes. The entry into ERM II may thus be
expected to have substantial consequences on the stance of their
economic policies. ERM II may also impinge on their economic growth
and inflation path. In their contribution to the present Issue, Jérôme
Creel and Sandrine Levasseur propose an assessment of the most likely
effects of adopting a relatively fixed-exchange-rate regime in the three
above-mentioned countries. Their most significant result points out the
specificities of the policy mix in Poland in comparison with that in the
other two countries. Creel and Levasseur thus conclude that Poland
may suffer more from entering ERM II than the Czech Republic and
Hungary.
In a first step, they review the monetary and fiscal policies imple-
mented in the three countries. They argue that capital inflows within
formerly fixed exchange rate regimes– which led to real exchange-rate
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3. The highest pensions were generally attached to occupational schemes but, Dupont argues,
they were not directed to the most productive or the most innovative occupations.appreciations, to a loss of competitiveness and to a worsening of the
current account– might explain the shift to a more flexible exchange
rate regime.
In a second step, Creel and Levasseur notably perform a multivariate
structural VAR analysis, incorporating the consumer price index (CPI),
the real effective exchange rate, industrial production and the nominal
short-term interest rate. Within this framework, they are able to distin-
guish the responses of these key variables to supply shocks, nominal
demand shocks, real demand shocks and financial shocks. Large and
eventually persistent real exchange rate variations after a shock can thus
be evaluated, as are the consequences of fiscal shocks on the CPI, the
exchange rate and industrial production. 
Impulse response functions show a very high degree of flexibility in
the CPI, which reveals the lower importance of administered prices in
the Czech Republic and Poland, and the substantial progress made by
the three economies towards a market economy. Creel and Levasseur
argue that high price flexibility, though a rather new phenomenon, surely
puts these three countries in line with the EU-15. Hence, the real trans-
mission mechanisms of monetary policy in these countries seem close
to the EU standards.
Creel and Levasseur’s results also show intriguing responses of the
CPI to a supply shock. Their evidence suggests that the Balassa-
Samuelson effect should not be overstated and that uncontrolled
wage-price spirals may be responsible for inflation trends and for real
appreciations. Adopting a fixed exchange-rate regime, like the ERM II,
should necessitate that real wage hikes be brought to an end, otherwise
competitiveness will be largely impaired, Creel and Levasseur argue. 
Finally, and in contrast to the Czech Republic and Hungary, nominal
shocks in Poland appear to have a strong and persistent effect on the
real effective exchange rate. Creel and Levasseur thus conclude that
adopting a firmly fixed exchange-rate regime in Poland seems rather
problematic. They also claim that the use of fiscal policy in Poland would
be fettered by the dispositions of the SGP: their evidence shows that
the impact of a fiscal shock on industrial production is substantial,
though it vanishes rather rapidly.
Euroisation
Sandrine Levasseur, in her contribution, reconsiders the issue of
unilateral euroisation (i.e. the unilateral adoption of the euro as legal
tender) for the accession countries. This issue gained some momentum
in these countries on the eve of the new millennium but finally ebbed
following the very negative reaction of the EU officials. 
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debates on unilateral euroisation in the near future because the political
and economic context has now radically changed from that prevailing
in the late nineties. Indeed, at that time, introducing the euro against
the will of EU officials would have probably deteriorated the prospects
of a quick EU accession. And, anyway, the CEECs were kindly
converging towards the Maastricht criteria which pave the way towards
EMU. Consequently, the political costs of unilateral euroisation were
probably prohibitive whereas the net economic gains were perceived
as too small or uncertain. Since then, changes have been twofold. First,
eight of CEECs candidates are now full members of EU. Second, some
of them exhibit a halt in their nominal convergence process towards
Maastricht criteria that may delay their entry in EMU. Consequently,
the balance between economic gains and costs of a unilateral euroi-
sation has evolved for CEECs while the credibility of (implicit) sanctions
by EU officials against a euroising country has become low, even null.
Indeed, due to the increasing economic and financial links between the
new and old member states, no credible threat (that is a threat which,
if carried out, would harm the euroising country but would not hurt
the Euro area) can be reasonably defined.
Given this new risk of unilateral euroisation, Levasseur considers
that either a consensual euroisation or, at least, a softening in nominal
convergence criteria would be a better option from the viewpoint of
both new and old member states. In her view, a consensual euroisation
(i.e. in accordance with the EU officials) would present the main
advantage of keeping the early introduction of the euro within a
controlled and structured process, which would reassure financial
markets. Indeed, the most uncertain gain related to unilateral euroi-
sation concerns its impact on interest rate. If the removal in the
exchange rate risk premium (against the euro) is over-compensated by
an increase in the perceived default risk (due to the loss of lender of
last resort or, of independent monetary policies), only the costs of
euroisation would be basically materialised, mainly the one-time cost of
seigniorage income. A consensual euroisation then would increase the
success of an early introduction of the euro, even outside the Treaty.
Levasseur finally points that, somewhat ironically, such a well-guided
euroisation would permit to reach more easily the Maastricht criteria.
Hence, a consensual euroisation should permit euroising countries to
join EMU and its institutions (including the participation in ECB
monetary policy decisions) only when the Maastricht criteria are fulfilled.
In that case, euroisation would be consistent with the sequencing and
economic rationale underlined in EU treaties to enter EMU: a
sustainable nominal convergence should be reached prior to entering
EMU institutions.
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Fiscal issues are prominent for emerging economies. Though the
CEECs cannot be labelled “emerging economies”, some EU candidate
countries can: Turkey is one example. The Turkish transition towards
the EU Copenhagen criteria has been slowed down by major currency
crises and in 2001, the exchange-rate anchor vis-à-vis the US dollar and
the euro had to be abandoned for a flexible exchange-rate regime. 
In their contribution to the present Issue, Jérôme Creel and Günes
Kamber investigate the relationship between fiscal policy, inflation and
the 2001 crisis, whose roots are to be found in currency turmoil and
banking weaknesses. The huge fiscal cost associated with this recent
crisis is understood to have modified fiscal policy at that time and given
rise to a deliberate policy of inflating and depreciating the currency in
order to provoke a debt deflation– a debt relief to cover the fiscal
costs. This economic policy was in sharp contrast with the restrictive
fiscal policy and the attachment to a nominal anchor which had been
implemented since 1999. Creel and Kamber argue that this shift in the
behaviour of fiscal authorities may have had some roots in the Fiscal
theory of the price level (hereafter FTPL). 
They perform a bivariate VAR incorporating the primary budget
surplus and public liabilities and focus on the response of the latter to
a shock on the former. Two outcomes are possible: if a positive shock
induces a reduction in public liabilities, the fiscal policy is said to be non-
inflationary; otherwise, the FTPL interpretation of the data is reliable. 
Creel and Kamber’s results are mixed. On the entire available sample,
a surplus shock provokes a significant positive impact on public liabil-
ities. Fiscal policy, they conclude, is able to drive prices up in order to
reduce the real value of public debt. However, excluding the most recent
years from their initial sample, hence scrapping the crisis’ year, the surplus
shock no longer has a positive impact on debt. Creel and Kamber
therefore argue that the recent Turkish public management of the
banking crisis can be considered as an “exceptional circumstance”. The
policy implications are as follows: without a substantial improvement in
the management of banks, a dramatic economic episode like the 2001
crisis could again occur and the Turkish disinflation efforts could be
wasted and lost for a long period. Hence, restructuring the banking
sector is a crucial challenge for Turkey. Although market regulations and
institutions have improved, financial sector surveillance has been
strengthened and FDI legislation have been modernised, the privatisation
of state-owned banks should be accelerated. Finally, Creel and Kamber
conclude that convergence of Turkey towards the EU standards in terms
of financial regulation seems a reasonable condition in order to avoid
definitely long years of high deficits and inflation.
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The distinction between economic and political issues is impossible
when budgetary decisions are concerned. Let us first mention the recent
propositions of the European Commission regarding the European
budget. Despite political lobbying by the contributors countries, which
had called for a decrease in the overall budget ceiling to its present
level (1% of the EU GNI, though the ceiling is 1.24%), the Commission
has made propositions that would make the budget tend towards its
ceiling. Though the amounts at stake are very limited, notably as regards
the new EU enlargement, the Commission’s position could be labelled
“brave”. But the adjective is excessive and possibly misleading. Because
in February 2004, Commissioners were close to their office term (a
new Commission will be appointed at the end of 2004), very ambitious
budgetary perspectives at the EU level could have been expected. A
debate would have then arisen between the advocates of two different
views regarding economic efficiency: some would have stated that
solidarity enhances overall efficiency, whereas some others would have
favoured a reduction in the financial costs of the EU policy (structural
funds, Common agricultural policy (CAP), etc.) leading to improved
economic efficiency. 
In his contribution to this special Issue, Jacques Le Cacheux presents
and discusses the main proposals that have been put forward during
the new round of the negotiations over the next multi-annual financial
perspectives for the period 2007-2013. Le Cacheux opposes two logics
within the European integration process: first, the accounting logic
(‘I want my money back’); and, second, the convergence logic. Whereas
the former logic strongly disapproves any further increase in the
European budget and generally associates solidarity to a resource waste,
the latter logic strongly refers to the Fathers of the European Economic
Community. Between those two ‘extremes’, another hybrid logic has
emerged and contributes to modifying priorities within the EU budget.
This logic is generally labelled the ‘Frankfurt-Brussels consensus’. In a
recent European report (the so-called ‘Sapir Report’) which draws
extensively on this ‘consensus’, the authors favour a decentralisation of
agricultural expenditures (hence, a re-nationalisation) and a deep
restructuring of the EU budget along two main principles: a focus on
common goals (in order to get rid of the aforementioned accounting
logic) and a budget which would target EU priorities. Among these
priorities, reorganising expenditures towards growth and convergence
would be prominent. Despite reference to the convergence logic, the
authors consider that the EU overall budget should not be raised and
they thus still stick to a European-wide accounting logic.
Le Cacheux makes an important contribution in evaluating the track
record of major common policies, among which the CAP. Hence, he
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‘Frankfurt-Brussels consensus’. Although, over the years, the CAP lost
its common European objective– the European satisfaction of food
needs– food security issues, he argues, are at stake and may still legiti-
mise the recourse to the CAP. Moreover, in the food and beverage
industries, the United States implement a very active policy which still
need a European counterpart. Le Cacheux then extends the analysis to
broader considerations about common policies, like the structural and
regional policies, and collective goods for the EU. He finally analyses
the pros and cons of various alternative sources of financing for the
EU budget, including a European tax.
Fiscal policy
As the CEECs enter the EU, they will have to satisfy the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP hereafter)4. Currently, countries like the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are still heavily burdened by
high budget deficits which will have to be reduced by expenditures cuts
and/or higher tax revenues. In his contribution to the present Issue,
Fabrizio Coricelli reviews the fundamental differences in the determi-
nants of public deficits between the new accession countries and the
average EU-15; he thus highlights that good fiscal rules for the EU-15
are not automatically good rules for the EU-25, keeping in mind that
fiscal rules in the EU-15 have even proved inefficient for the EU-15
countries themselves…
According to Coricelli, four substantial differences between the EU-
15 and the CEECs should be acknowledged: first, output growth in the
CEECs is high and volatile and it can be expected that these two
features could well lead to substantial swings in the public deficit to
GDP ratios. Consequently, the 3% deficit ceiling may not be sufficient
to let automatic stabilisers play fully. Second, within the EU context,
the CEECs will apply to the Structural funds, and this will necessitate
that a local co-financing be implemented. Third, in their catching up
process, the CEECs dramatically need better infrastructures whose
financing is expected to come mainly from public institutions. The
consequent level of public investment is thus expected to remain higher
than in the EU-15. At last, according to Coricelli, the balance between
large and small countries as far as the SGP procedures are concerned
is expected to keep on being at the advantage of the former ones:
relatively small and poor CEE countries may thus only participate in a
“second league” within the enlarged EU; knowing this, CEECs may find
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4. Only countries in the Euro area can be imposed fines in the case of an excessive deficit.
During the first five years of the Euro area, despite excessive deficit procedures, no country has
had to pay a financial sanction.little incentive to curb their fiscal deficits. In fact, this “second league”
would already exist: Coricelli notes that EU institutions have had so far
a “benign neglect” approach vis-à-vis public finances issues related to
the CEECs. Quoting Coricelli: “a clear indication that high deficits would
not be accepted within the EU fiscal framework, starting from May
2004, would have served as a strong deterrent against loose fiscal
policies in CEECs. It is ironic that the paternalistic approach towards
acceding countries has contributed to softening the budget constraints
for national governments”.
To sum up, the first point highlighted by Coricelli assumes that higher
fiscal margins for manoeuvre are necessary for the CEECs; the second
and third points emphasise the expected future growth in public expen-
ditures in these countries; and the fourth point focuses on the bad
enforcement of the current EU fiscal framework. Public deficits in the
CEECs are thus intended to grow and this increase is economically
largely sensible. Coricelli thus proposes a reform of the SGP in which
he promotes an expenditure rule. Instead of planning future public
expenditures and deficits via projected  real output growth, Coricelli
argues that that they should be planned according to the projected
potential output growth.
Coricelli shows that the European cyclically-adjusted balances (CAB),
computed with projections of real output growth, can only be given a
very loose interpretation as a discretionary policy. The recent amend-
ments to the SGP proposed by the European Commission are thus at
stake: promoting the CAB as a good indicator for the fiscal stance is
flawed. In fact, when real growth is high, the relative improvement in
the CAB cannot be (fully) attributed to discretion, but conversely, when
real growth is low, the deterioration in the CAB cannot be attributed
to discretion: it is therefore very ambiguous to prosecute governments
for so-called lax behaviour.
Monetary decision-making in the Euro area
In his contribution to the present Issue, Piotr Stanek suggests an
original political economy view on the reforms of the ESCB (European
system of central banks). Alongside an ‘economic efficiency’ criterion, he
also considers the European-wide political acceptability and the
perception by the public as key criteria for judging proposals for reform.
Developing his own set of three-stage optimal criteria and his own
taxonomy, Stanek evaluates the relevance of the different reform
proposals, from status quo to rotation, in the European context. He
finally proposes a new reform proposal which suits better the set of
optimal criteria. 
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promoted reforms: rotation and grouping of countries. Rotation means
that governors of national central banks participate in votes with a
certain frequency and consequently are not allowed to vote during
some periods. Representation (or grouping of countries) relies on
pooling national central banks in a few constituencies and on allocating
a certain number of votes to each group. The ECB’s proposal consisted
in dividing countries into three groups with weights related to the GDP
shares in the Euro area total and to the amount of total assets within
each national financial sector. However, no reform should occur before
the Euro area exceeds 15 members, and only two groups (rather than
three) would be organised so long as current members of the Euro
area would be comprised between 16 and 21. In this latter case, Stanek
points that the ECB’s Governing Council would comprise up to 24
members, which is dramatically excessive and would surely lead to the
total paralysis of a key EU institution. 
According to Stanek’s classification, the ECB reform proposal might
be even worse than the status quo: the lack of transparency and
precision on the mechanisms defining the rotation scheme, as well as
the relative vagueness of the conditions leading to the eventual
postponement of the reform, largely hinder its political acceptability and
might result in a poor public understanding of the reform.
Stanek proposes instead that monetary decisions be split between
two different bodies within the ESCB. Interest-rate setting and
exchange-rate policy should be addressed by a Board whose number
would be increased from six to nine in order to gain a “larger political
representation”. Since the Board’s members would be appointed by
governments’ heads, it would be necessary to improve both accounta-
bility and transparency through the publications of minutes of the
Board’s meetings. Finally, the ECB’s Governing Council would still be
comprised of all national central bankers from the Euro area, plus the
Board, and its task would be limited to setting the broad policy guide-
lines. The Council would also have an advisory power to the Board,
so that the Governing Council would retain some control over the new
Board. Hence, Stanek stresses the need for centralisation of powers as
far as strategic decisions are at stake, but he also points the need for
political acceptability: unlike rotation and centralisation, every national
central banker would be voting on any non-strategic decision. Though
his proposal dramatically depends on the capacity to separate the
interest-rate setting from the broad policy guidelines, Stanek puts it right
when he emphasises that a prerequisite for an optimal enforcement of
an optimal monetary rule is an optimal acceptability of the monetary
reform: leave one country aside and you will never gain full support
for your actions, though you need it crucially.
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The post-Communist transition of CEECs and their consequent
deep trade and financial liberalisation processes have urged fears of a
sharp increase in EU-15 firms’ relocation towards the CEECs, thanks
to a mix of lower wages, relatively highly-skilled workers and lower
capital per capita ratios in comparison with the EU-15. Fears also
included a capital rush towards the CEECs, where yields on investment
should have been higher than in the EU-15, and consequently lower
investment in the EU-15 which, in turn, would have led to a decrease
in real wages in the EU-155
The question of industrial relocation is at the core of the contri-
bution of Sébastien Dupuch, Hugues Jennequin and El Mouhoub
Mouhoud in this Issue, with strong emphasis on the flows of foreign
direct investments (FDIs) and on trade specialisation. The three
authors insist on two patterns of industrial specialisation whose
respective consequences on the EU-15 are very different. First, inter-
industry specialisation can be related to the international division of
labour: differences in factor endowments drive trade specialisation.
Quoting the authors: “this can confine countries whose specialisation
is driven by traditional and unskilled labour-intensive industries in a
low-development trap.” In these countries, FDIs are driven by
countries’ comparative advantages. In contrast, intra-industry speciali-
sation draws on the quality of the factors involved in the production
process: highly-skilled workers coupled with initially well endowed
physical capital, transport and telecommunications infrastructures are
thus able to attract the whole chain of the production process.
Consequently, well-endowed countries do not only produce inter-
mediate goods but also final goods. In these countries, FDIs are driven
by the search for higher local market shares.
Dupuch, Jennequin and El Mouhoub Mouhoud consider the theory
of the New Economic Geography and argue that a core-periphery
equilibrium is expected to occur in the enlarged EU as a result of vertical
linkages within industries. Then, they show that the sectoral divergence
resulting from agglomeration economies is likely to persist through a
high-skilled core attracting increasing intensive activities and a low-skilled
periphery. The core would be comprised of Central European countries
which would be expected to follow a “Spanish model” based on
catching-up industrial diversification and intra-industry trade. Eastern
countries, at the periphery, would durably lag behind and would mainly
have to compete with Mediterranean countries.
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5. A related, more precise, analysis can be found in Fitoussi J.-P. and E.S. Phelps (1990), “Note
sur les conséquences globales de la reconstruction de l’Europe de l’Est et l’épargne mondiale”, in
Fitoussi J.-P. (ed.), A l’Est, en Europe, des économies en transition, collection Références, Paris: Presses
de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.As far as trade specialisation patterns are concerned, Dupuch,
Jennequin and El Mouhoub Mouhoud base their conclusion on two
different indices. First, according to the Krugman specialisation index,
the trade specialisation of the Czech Republic and Hungary, for instance,
is relatively low and similar to that of wide-open European economies
like the Netherlands and Sweden. In contrast, trade specialisation of
more peripheral CEECs countries like the Baltic States is large and even
superior to that of the most peripheral EU-15 countries like Greece,
Portugal or Ireland. Second, according to the Finger-Kreinin index, the
similarity in export structures is high between Spain and the biggest new
accession countries, which indicates some convergence with the
“Spanish model”. This index also testifies to the high similarity of export
structures within the CEECs themselves which leads the authors to the
following conclusion: “the main competitors of the candidate countries
are still the candidate countries themselves”. 
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